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Abstract
Calibration is a basic property for prediction systems, and algorithms
for achieving it are well-studied in both statistics and machine learning.
In many applications, however, the predictions are used to make decisions
that select which observations are made. This makes calibration difficult,
as adjusting predictions to achieve calibration changes future data. We
focus on click-through-rate (CTR) prediction for search ad auctions. Here,
CTR predictions are used by an auction that determines which ads are
shown, and we want to maximize the value generated by the auction.
We show that certain natural notions of calibration can be impossible
to achieve, depending on the details of the auction. We also show that
it can be impossible to maximize auction efficiency while using calibrated
predictions. Finally, we give conditions under which calibration is achiev-
able and simultaneously maximizes auction efficiency: roughly speaking,
bids and queries must not contain information about CTRs that is not
already captured by the predictions.
1 Introduction
Calibration is a fundamental measure of accuracy in prediction problems: if
we group all the events a predictor says happen with probability p, about a
p fraction should occur. This property has been extensively studied in the
stochastic and online settings.
We study problems where the predictions themselves partially determine
which events occur. Our general approach applies to many problems where
predictions are used to make decisions, but we are motivated in particular by the
application to search engine advertising. Over the past decade, this business has
grown to tens of billions of dollars, and prediction systems play a fundamental
role.
In a typical interaction, first a user does a query (say “flowers”) on a search
engine. Then, the search engine selects a set of candidate ads that can be
shown on the given query, based on keywords provided by advertisers. These
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components can be reasonably approximated by an IID process. A prediction
is made for each candidate ad, and an auction ranks the ads based on the
prediction and the bid of the advertiser. Typically, the bid indicates the value
of a click to the advertiser, and the score is simply the product of the bid and the
prediction, giving an estimate of the value generated by showing the ad. Finally,
some of these ads are shown to the user (we consider two models: the single
top-ranked ad is shown, or all the ads with scores above a certain threshold are
shown). This auction selection mechanism has been extensively studied, and
has many nice properties [19, 8].
In this setting, an important measure of the quality of the predictions is how
much value the auction generates (equivalently, how efficient are the allocations
produced by the auction). The auction mechanisms we consider are in fact
designed to maximize the combined value to the search engine and advertiser if
bids accurately reflect value and the true click-through-rates (CTRs) are known.
The algorithm used to predict CTRs for such a system faces many constraints
already, for example, the need to process enormous volumes of data quickly
and produce predictions with extremely low latency (e.g., [13]). Thus, rather
than advocating new algorithms, we focus on applying a post-correction via a
prediction map to the outputs of an existing system in order to improve the
quality of the predictions.
We consider two main questions. Informally stated: 1) Do efficiency-maximizing
prediction maps with calibration properties exist, and can they can be found
computationally efficiently? 2) If we iteratively calibrate our predictions so they
match observed CTRs, does the process converge? And if so, is this prediction
map efficiency maximizing?
Outline and Summary of Results We formalize our model and questions in
Section 2, where we introduce two primary variants of the selection mechanism
that lead to different properties; Section 3 and 4 investigate these mechanisms
in the general case. We demonstrate that without further assumptions, in both
our models it may be impossible for a deterministic prediction map to produce
calibrated predictions on the ads it serves, and iterative calibration procedures
can fail badly. Since some deterministic map always maximizes value, this is
unfortunate. When all ads above a certain threshold are shown, we give an
algorithm for finding this value-maximizing map in polynomial time, but when
the single highest-rated ad is shown, we prove finding the value-maximizing map
is NP-hard (even if we knew the true CTRs).
In Section 5 we introduce additional assumptions that are sufficient to guar-
antee calibration procedures are well-behaved. While these assumptions are
fairly strong, they are not unreasonable for real systems. Our strongest as-
sumption is essentially that in all cases bid and query provide no more informa-
tion than the raw prediction about average CTRs; under this assumption, we
can show in both selection models a value-maximizing and calibrated prediction
map exists. Under threshold selection, somewhat weaker conditions are in fact
sufficient.
2
Related Work Calibration has been extensively studied. Much of the ear-
liest work is in the probabilistic forecasting literature [1, 6, 18]. Calibration is
particularly important when comparing predictors, since two sets of calibrated
predictions can be fairly evaluated by how concentrated they are on observed
outcomes [7, 12, 11]. Calibration also makes it easier to use predictions. For
example, it is easier to threshold the output of a calibrated classifier to minimize
weighted classification error [5].
Not all prediction systems are naturally calibrated. However, when examples
are drawn IID, if we have a good but uncalibrated predictor, we can calibrate
it by applying a prediction map. For example, boosted trees are uncalibrated,
but become excellent probability estimators after calibration [16, 2]. The two
most common methods for calibration are Platt scaling, which is equivalent to
logistic regression, and isotonic regression [17, 20, 15, 3].
Calibration is also studied in the online setting, where no stochastic assump-
tions are made on the sequence of examples; in the worst case, they could be
chosen by an adversary that sees our predictions. It is easy to see that in this
setting, no deterministic classifier (or prediction map) can produce calibrated
predictions for all sequences. However, if the system is allowed to use random-
ness (that is, predict a distribution), then calibration can be achieved ([9, 10]
and [4, Sec 4.5]).
2 Problem Formalization
The interaction of calibration and selection has received little direct attention in
the literature, so constructing a suitable model requires some care: we require
a formulation that is theoretically tractable but still captures the key charac-
teristics of the real-world problems of interest.
We begin by defining our units of prediction (queries and ads) and the mech-
anism used to select them (auctions). We assume a fixed, existing prediction
system provides a raw prediction for each ad; our study will then concern predic-
tion maps, functions that attempt to map these raw predictions to calibrated
probabilities. Once this framework is established, we can formally state the
questions we study.
We model the interaction between a search engine’s users and advertising
system. There is a fixed finite set of queries Q (strings like “flowers” or “car
insurance” typed into the search engine), which are chosen according to distri-
bution PrQ(q) for q ∈ Q. There is also a fixed finite set of ads C which can be
shown alongside queries. Each ad i ∈ C is defined by tuple (pi, bi, zi, qi) where
qi ∈ Q is the (only) query for which ad i can show,
1 pi is the true probability
of a click, bi is the bid (the maximum amount the advertiser is willing to pay
for a click), and zi ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is a bucketed estimate of pi (we call zi the raw
prediction). That is, we assume the predictions of the underlying prediction
system have been discretized into K buckets. We drop the q (and sometimes z)
1This is without loss of generality, as we can always replicate ads for each query to which
the advertiser has targeted the ad.
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from the ad tuples when those values are clear from context. Each ad can show
for a single query q, so we define C(q) ≡ {i |qi = q}, the indexes of the candidate
ads for query q.
Our goal is to find good prediction maps f : {1, . . . ,K} → [0, 1]. The
prediction map will be used in the auction selection mechanism: First, a query
is sampled from PrQ, and then the candidate ads for that query are ranked by
b · f(z) (we drop the subscripts when we mean an arbitrary ad). We consider
two models for which ads show:
ONE: We only show a single ad. If multiple ads achieve the highest value of
b · f(z), we pick one uniformly at random.
ALL: We show all ads where b · f(z)− 1 > 0.
Mechanism ONE models the case of an oversold auction, where ads with different
raw predictions z must compete for a single position. Mechanism ALL models
the case where all eligible ads with positive predicted value can be shown. In
general, mechanism ALL is much easier to work with theoretically, because for
z1 6= z2, changing f(z1) does not change which ads with prediction z2 are shown.
In either case, we assume any candidate (p, b, z) which is shown is clicked with
probability p.2
Distributions on Ads Other than the distribution PrQ, all probabilities and
expectations will be with respect to some distribution on the set of candidate
ads C. Two distributions will be of particular importance: PrC , the uniform
distribution over candidate ads, and Prf , the distribution of ads shown by a
prediction map f . We formalize these as follows:
PrC is the distribution on ads where PrC(i) is proportional to Pr
Q(qi). That
is, letting C ≡
∑
i∈C Pr
Q(qi), we have PrC(i) =
PrQ(qi)
C
. This is not the same as
choosing a random query q from PrQ and then choosing a random candidate.
For example, suppose there are two queries q1 and q2, with Pr
Q(q1) =
1
2 and
PrQ(q2) =
1
2 . There is one candidate a1 for query q1, and two candidates,
a2 and a3 for query q2. Then, PrC(ai) = 1/3 for each ad, which means the
marginal probability PrC(q1) =
1
3 and PrC(q2) =
2
3 . One can think of PrC as
the distribution on ads shown if we showed all the eligible candidates for each
query that occurs.
Prf for a prediction map f is the distribution on ads where Prf (i) is pro-
portional to wi ≡ Pr
Q(qi)Pr(ad i shows | qi, f). The second term is actually
only random in the case of selection mechanism ONE, when randomness is used
to break ties. The distribution Prf is thus the distribution on ads shown when
serving using prediction map f . Using this notation, Prf (i |q) = Pr(ad i shows |
qi, f).
We use EC [·] and Ef [·] for the corresponding expectations.
2This ignores the well-known issue of position normalization; this aspect of the problem is
largely orthogonal to our work.
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Calibration We say a prediction map f is calibrated on a distribution on ads
D if
∀z, E(p,b,z,q)∼D[p |z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average CTR given z
= f(z).︸ ︷︷ ︸
Predicted CTR given z
The choice of the distribution D in the above definition is critical; a single f
will in general not be able to achieve calibration for multiple D. For the auction
selection problem, the natural distribution to consider is Prf . Thus, we will
be particularly concerned with finding self-calibrated prediction maps f , which
satisfy
∀z, Ef [p |z] = f(z).
In general one may not be able to estimate Ef [ p | z ] exactly, and so cali-
bration will only be approximately achievable. This issue is orthogonal to our
results, so we assume that the necessary expected quantities can be estimated
exactly. Thus, we emphasize that our negative results are a fundamental limi-
tation, rather than a byproduct of insufficient data.
Auction Efficiency In addition to calibration, we are concerned with how
the choice of f impacts the auction mechanism. The expected value of showing
ad (p, b) is p · b− cost, where we take cost = 1 for selection mechanism ALL, and
cost = 0 for ONE. We assume the bid b reflects the true value to the advertiser of
a click, which is justified by the incentives of the auction under a suitable pric-
ing scheme [19]. The cost can be viewed as the cost per impression of showing
the ad (either a cost incurred by the user doing the query or incurred by the
search engine itself). In practice such costs might be different for clicked versus
unclicked ad impressions, and might vary depending on the ad and query. Ex-
tending our results to such a models would add a significant notational burden,
so we focus on the simplest interesting cost models.
For a given query q, the expected value generated is∑
i∈C(q)
Pr(ad i shows |f, q)(pibi − cost).
The expected value per query is just
EV(f) =
∑
q∈Q
PrQ(q)
∑
i∈C(q)
Prf (i |q)(pibi − cost)
=
∑
i∈C
wi(pibi − cost).
We say an f∗ ∈ argmaxf EV(f) is efficiency maximizing. Our goal is to find an
f that transforms the z into the best possible predictions in terms of efficiency.
Note that if it was possible to predict exactly pi for ad i, these predictions would
maximize efficiency.
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Questions Ideally, we would like to use prediction maps that are self-calibrated
and efficiency-maximizing; we say such prediction maps are nice, and say a prob-
lem instance is nice if such a map exists.
First, we consider questions relating to the offline problem where we have ac-
cess to all the problem data. Note that there must exist an efficiency-maximizing
prediction map.3
Q1 Are all problem instances nice? That is, do self-calibrated efficiency-
maximizing prediction maps always exist?
Q2 Can an efficiency-maximizing prediction map, even one that is not self-
calibrated, be found in polynomial time?
In practice, we are further concerned with learning a good prediction map
from observed data. Suppose we start with some f0, for example the function
that gives the predictions of the underlying system. Then, we serve some large
number of queries with this f0, and observe the results. We would like to then
train an improved f1 from this data, serve another large batch of queries ranked
using f1, then train an f2, etc.
A natural procedure is to choose ft so that the predictions on the ads shown
in batch t − 1 would have been calibrated under ft. Of course, when we then
select ads using ft on the next batch, we may show different ads. Formally,
define T : [0, 1]K → [0, 1]K (a function from prediction maps to prediction
maps) by T (f) = f ′ where
f ′(z) =
{
Ef [p |z] when Prf (z) > 0
f(z) otherwise.
We assume we have enough data in each batch so that we can calculate Eft−1 [p |
z] exactly. Then, we ask:
Q3 Does T always have at most a small (polynomial) number of fixed points?
Q4 Does T always have at least one fixed point where ads are shown?
Q3 is important, because with an affirmative answer we could potentially enu-
merate the fixed points and find the best one from an efficiency perspective. A
negative answer to Q4 implies the iterative calibration procedure will cycle. To
see this, note that for a given starting point f0, subsequent ft(z) can only take
on finitely many values: E[p |z] for some distribution of ads that show (finitely
many values), or f0(z). That means that T maps some finite set of calibration
maps into itself. Since it has no fixed points, T is a permutation and so must
cycle.
In the next two sections, we address these questions in the general case
(putting no additional restrictions on the problem instances).
3Note EV depends only on the ordering of the ads for each query induced by f , and so
over all possible f , EV takes on only a finite number of distinct values.
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Ad CTR bid min pˆ EV cumulative CTR
1 0.1 1/(0.1) = 10.0 0.10 0.00 0.10
2 0.2 2/(0.1 + 0.2) ≈ 6.7 0.15 0.33 0.15
3 0.3 3/(0.1 + 0.2 + 0.3) = 5.0 0.20 0.50 0.20
4 0.4 4/(0.1 + · · ·+ 0.4) = 4.0 0.25 0.60 0.25
Figure 1: An example with 5 fixed points, one for each prefix of the list of ads.
For each i, setting pˆ to the value in the “min pˆ” column induces a fixed point
where ads 1, . . . , i show. The fifth fixed point is the degenerate one that shows
no ads, with say pˆ = 0.
3 Mechanism ALL: Threshold Selection
In this section, we consider the case where we select ads by mechanism ALL,
that is, we show all ads where b · f(z)− 1 ≥ 0.
We will show that an efficiency-maximizing prediction map can be found
efficiently (Q2), but without further assumptions, Q1, Q3, and Q4 are answered
in the negative. We prove the negative results first; for this purpose, it is
sufficient to construct counter-examples.
In this section, the examples we construct all require only a single query
where all of the candidates have the same raw prediction z. Thus, choosing
prediction map reduces to choosing a single value pˆ ∈ [0, 1]. The selection rule
simply shows all candidates where b · f(z) = b · pˆ ≥ 1.
Q1: All fixed points can have bad efficiency Consider an example with
2n+ 1 candidate ads, divided into three classes, with ads given as (p, b) tuples:
A) 1 ad is (0.5, 2.0), shown if pˆ ≥ 0.5
B) n ads are (1, 1.9), shown if pˆ ≥ 1/1.9 ≈ 0.53
C) n ads are (0, 1.8), shown if pˆ ≥ 1/1.8 ≈ 0.56
We either show no ads, A, A+B, or A+B+C. Choosing pˆ = 0.5 is a fixed
point (it only shows the first ad) which generates value 0.5 · 2 − 1 = 0. Using
pˆ = 0.54 shows A+B, and generates value 0.9n. But, this is not a fixed point:
the observed CTR is near one (for large n). Showing all the ads (which occurs
for any pˆ > 1/1.8) is not a fixed point, and generates negative value, since ads
from class C generate value −n.
Q3: An example with exponentially many fixed points Suppose there
are n candidates (pi, bi) where the pi are distinct, and we have indexed by
i so that pi is strictly increasing. Further, suppose bi =
i
p1:i
, a decreasing
sequence (using the shorthand p1:i ≡
∑i
j=1 pj). Pick any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and let
pˆ = 1
bi
. We show candidate j if bj pˆ =
bj
bi
≥ 1. Since the bids are decreasing,
we show candidate j if and only if j ≤ i. Thus, serving with pˆ = 1
bi
= p1:i
i
we
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show candidates 1, . . . , i, and so the average CTR is in fact pˆ. Thus, for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is a fixed-point pˆ that shows ads {1, . . . , i}. Figure 1 shows
an example of this construction. If we have m queries each with a distinct fixed
raw prediction z and n candidates constructed in this manner, we can choose a
per-query fixed point independently for each query, for nm distinct fixed points.
Q4: An example with no fixed points Consider a single query with two
candidates, (p1 = 0.7, b1 = 4, z) and (p2 = 0.1, b2 = 2, z). For any pˆ ≥ 0.5,
both ads show and we observe a click-through-rate of 0.4, so no such pˆ can
be self-calibrated. For any pˆ ∈ [0.25, 0.5), only ad 1 shows, and we observe a
click-through rate of 0.7. For pˆ ∈ [0, 0.25), we don’t show any ads. Thus, there
is no non-trivial fixed point; assuming we start with pˆ ≥ 0.25, the calibration
procedure will cycle between 0.7 and 0.4.
Q2: Calculating the efficiency-maximizing f The above examples show
that self-calibrated prediction maps may not exist, and that even if they do,
they need not maximize efficiency.
Nevertheless, given access to the full problem data (including true click-
through rates) one might be interested in calculating an efficiency maximizing
prediction map. The following algorithm accomplishes this in polynomial time.
We define f∗ by considering each z′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} independently:
1. Consider the set of candidates (p, b, z, q) where z = z′, and sort these
candidates in decreasing order of bid, for j = 1, . . . , nj . We must show
some prefix of this list. In particular, if we set pˆ = 1/bj and bj+1 < bj ,
then we will show exactly ads 1, . . . , j.
2. For each j where bj+1 < bj , compute the expected value per query of using
pˆj = 1/bj (which shows ads 1, . . . , j). This can be computed as
EV(pˆj) =
j∑
i=1
PrQ(qi)(pi · bi − 1).
3. Let f(z) = pˆj∗ where pˆj∗ is the value that maximizes EV(pˆj).
While this result is interesting theoretically (especially in contrast to results
in the next section), we note it is not likely to be useful in practice: if it was
possible to estimate pi accurately for each ad, then one could simply throw out
the coarser-grained predictions zi and use these estimates.
4 Mechanism ONE: Selecting One Ad
In this section, we consider results for selection mechanism ONE. When there is
only a single query, or only a single raw prediction, selection mechanism ONE can
be quickly analyzed, and our questions are in fact answered in the affirmative,
except for Q3. But in non-trivial cases, we again show negative answers to all
four questions.
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Single query, multiple raw predictions Selection mechanism ONE becomes
rather degenerate under a single query. We show how to construct a nice f ,
answering Q1 and Q2, and Q4 in the affirmative.
For each raw prediction z′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, observe that if an ad with zi = z
′
shows, it must be an ad that has bid b(z′) ≡ maxj:zj=z′ bj. Thus, if an ad
with z′ shows, the expected value generated is b(z′) · EC [p | z
′, b(z′)], where
EC [p | z
′, b(z′)] is the average click-through-rate of ads with z = z′, b = b(z′).
We can guarantee we obtain this value by simply setting f(z′) = EC [p |z
′, b(z′)]
and f(z) = 0 for all z 6= z′. Note that this f is self-calibrated because ties are
broken uniformly at random under selection mechanism ONE, answering Q4 in
the affirmative. We obtain maximum efficiency by using the f that only shows
ads with raw prediction
z∗ = argmax
z
b(z) · EC [p |z, b(z)].
Let fz be the f function that only shows candidates with the given z value.
Thus, fz∗ is nice. However, we can define a more satisfying f
∗ by
f∗(z) = Efz [p |z].
We only show ads (b, z) where b·f∗(z) achieves the argmax value over candidates,
and in fact
b · f∗(z) = b(z) · Efz [p |z],
and so we still maximize efficiency.
The answer to Q3 is negative: iterative calibration can have exponentially
many fixed points. Suppose each ad i has a distinct zi, and pi = b
−1
i . Let I be
any subset of the ads and define fI : fI(zi) = pi for i ∈ I, fI(zi) = 0 for i 6∈ I.
Then, under fI all ads in I tie, so we show them randomly. Each of the 2
|C|
subsets of C thus corresponds to a self-calibrated prediction map that shows a
different set of ads.
Multiple queries, single raw prediction Under mechanism ONE, if there is
a single raw prediction z made for all candidates (on all queries), then the ads
that show are in fact independent of the value pˆ = f(z) > 0: for each query,
we always randomly pick one of the candidates with the highest bid. Thus,
any pˆ > 0 is efficiency-maximizing, and we can choose pˆ equal to the average
observed CTR to obtain self-calibration. Thus, in this case we answer Q1- Q4
in the affirmative.
Q2: NP-hardness in general In general (with at least two distinct raw
predictions and at least two queries), under selection mechanism ONE, the offline
problem of finding the efficiency-maximizing prediction map f is NP-hard, even
if all bids are 1. We show this using a reduction from the minimum feedback arc
set (MFAS) problem on tournaments (see, for example, Kleinberg et al. [14]).
In this problem, there are n players, {1, . . . , n}, that have just completed a
tournament where every pair of players has played. The MFAS for this problem
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is a ranking of the players that minimizes the number of upsets; that is, if µi is
the rank of player i, we want a ranking µ that minimizes the number of times
µi > µj , but player j beat player i.
We encode this problem as an auction efficiency maximization problem as
follows: There are n distinct z values, 1, . . . , n, one for each player, and there
are 12n(n − 1) queries (each equally likely), one for each (i, j) pair with i < j.
The query for the pair (i, j) (where i beat j without loss of generality) has two
candidates (p, z), namely (1, i) and (0, j). Thus, if we show the ad corresponding
to the winner (with z = i), we have p = 1, and the bid is 1, so we get value 1;
if we show ad with z = j, we have p = 0, we get no value. It is then clear that
the efficiency-maximizing ranking of the raw predictions z exactly corresponds
to the solution to the MFAS problem.
Negative results for Q1, Q3, and Q4 in general We also show negative
results for Q1, Q3, and Q4 in general.
For Q1, observe that in the NP-hardness construction when there is a perfect
ranking, we observe a CTR of 1.0, and so the efficiency-maximizing prediction
map cannot be self-calibrated. We can illustrate this directly with the following
example. There are four ads, each given as (p, b, z) tuples:
q1 q2
A (1.0, 2, z1) C (1.0, 2, z2)
B (0.0, 2, z2) D (0.0, 1, z1)
We need f(z1) > f(z2) in order to guarantee we show Ad A on q1; we also need
f(z2) >
1
2f(z1) in order to show Ad C on q2. We will observe a 1.0 CTR on
both z1 and z2 on any such efficiency maximizing f , but we are constrained to
pick f(z2) < f(z1) ≤ 1, and so no such f can be self-calibrated.
For Q3, we have already shown multiple fixed points in the single-query
case. If we consider multiple queries, where each query has a single distinct raw
prediction, we immediately arrive at a problem with exponentially many fixed
points.
For Q4, it is straightforward to construct an example with cycles, but con-
structing one with no fixed point is a bit trickier. In particular, any time there
is some prediction z where each query has at least one ad with prediction z, we
can always find a fixed point by setting f(z′) = 0 for z′ 6= z and f(z) > 0. The
set of ads shown will be independent of the non-zero value f(z), so we can set it
equal to the observed CTR, achieving self-calibration (except in the degenerate
case where all the ads with prediction z have zero CTR).
However, it is still possible to construct problems with no fixed points with-
out resorting to such degeneracy, as the following example illustrates. Each
query is equally likely, all the bids are 1, and the (p, z) ad tuples are:
q1 q2 q1 q2
A (0.5, z1) B (0.6, z2) C (0.5, z1) E (0.2, z2)
D (0.6, z2) F (0.3, z1)
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both Prop E1 =⇒ Prop E2 (immediate)
ALL Prop E2⇐⇒ Prop SI Thm 1
ALL Prop E2 =⇒ nice Thm 2
ALL Prop E1 =⇒ nice (from above)
ONE Prop E1 =⇒ nice Thm 3
both Prop SI 6=⇒ Prop E1 Sec 5.2
ONE Prop E2 6=⇒ Prop SI Sec 5.2
ONE Prop SI 6=⇒ nice Sec 5.2
Table 1: Relationships between problem properties. A “nice” problem instance
is one where a self-calibrated efficiency-maximizing prediction map exists.
If f(z1) > f(z2), then we show ads A,B, C, and F. In this case, we observe a
CTR of (0.5 + 0.5 + 0.3)/3 = 0.433 for z1, and 0.6 for z2, so we cannot be self-
calibrated. If f(z1) < f(z2), we show ads A, B, D, and E, and observe a CTR
of (0.6 + 0.6 + 0.2)/3 = 0.467 for z2, and 0.5 for z1, and so again we cannot be
self-calibrated. Finally, if f(z1) = f(z2), we always show A and B, and show the
other ads half of the time. Thus, we observe a CTR of (3/4)0.5+(1/4)0.3 = 0.45
for z1, and a CTR of (3/4)0.6 + (1/4)0.2 = 0.5 for z2, and so again we cannot
be well-calibrated. Thus, no self-calibrated f exists for this problem.
5 Sufficient Conditions
As the previous two sections show, without additional assumptions significant
problems arise if one tries to achieve both calibration and auction efficiency. In
this section, we introduce additional assumptions that are sufficient to guarantee
nice prediction maps exist. Table 1 summarizes our results.
The intuition behind our results is a basic property of conditional probability.
Calibration depends on the conditional expectation E[p |z]. In general, selection
changes the distribution this expectation is with respect to. But if selection is
only a function of z, it does not change the conditional distribution of p given
z, since the latter is already conditioned on z.
For example, suppose we have a single query, and that all bids are 1, so
all selection decisions are functions of z. This means that E[p | z] does not
change under selection, and thus defines an efficiency-maximizing self-calibrated
prediction map. To extend this intuition to more realistic auctions, we need to
make sure that the query and the bid do not add any information about p, so
that selection does not change E[p | z] and the different E[p | z] for each query
can be reconciled. We now state these properties formally:
Prop E1 For each z there exists a value p¯(z) such that for each query q with
PrC(q |z) > 0, and for each b with PrC(b |q, z) > 0,
EC [p |z, b, q] = EC [p |z, q] = EC [p |z] ≡ p¯(z). (1)
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That is, in all cases the bid and query provide no more information than the raw
prediction about average click-through rates.4 For this assumption, the natural
prediction map to consider is f(z) = p¯(z).
Prop E2 A weaker assumption is that
EC [p |z, b] = EC [p |z] (2)
whenever both expectations are defined. This essentially marginalizes over
queries, rather than holding simultaneously for all q.
Prop SI A problem instance is selection-invariant if for all f, f ′, for any z
where both Ef [p |z] and Ef ′ [p |z] are defined, we have
Ef [p |z] = Ef ′ [p |z]. (3)
Selection invariance says that the observed CTR for a given raw prediction z is
independent of the prediction map used for selection. Under this assumption,
the natural calibration map to consider is f∗(z) = Efz [p | z], where fz is any
prediction map that shows some ads with raw prediction z.
It is easy to show that Prop E1 implies Prop E2.
A weak per-query variant of Prop E1 is that, for all z, b, and q (when defined),
EC [p | z, b, q] = EC [p | z, q]. We can dismiss this assumption as insufficient,
as we can take the negative examples of Section 3 and re-state them where
each candidate occurs on a distinct query, each equally likely. Thus, the above
property holds trivially, but the pathological behaviors still occur.
5.1 Properties that Imply Nice Maps Exist
First, we show that under mechanism ALL, Prop E2 and Prop SI are equivalent;
we then show that Prop E2 (and hence also Prop SI) imply a nice problem.
Theorem 1. Under selection mechanism ALL, Prop E2 is equivalent to Prop SI
(selection invariance).
Proof sketch. Suppose Prop E2 holds. Selection mechanism ALL must show ei-
ther all of the candidates with a given (z, b) combination, or none of them.
Thus, for any f where Prf (z, b) > 0, we must have
Ef [p |z, b] = EC [p |z, b]. (4)
Then, for any f , assuming Ef [p |z] is defined,
Ef [p |z] = Ef [Ef [p |z, b]]
= Ef [EC [p |z, b]] Eq. (4)
= Ef [EC [p |z]] Prop E2
= EC [p |z].
4Note that this does not hold under the NP-Hardness reduction for ONE in the previous
section, as EC [p |z, q] 6= EC [p |z].
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For the other direction, suppose we have selection invariance (Prop SI). It is
sufficient to consider a fixed raw prediction z (if there are multiple z, we can
consider them independently). Also, we can assume candidates have distinct
bids - if multiple candidates have the same bid and raw prediction, mechanism
ALL treats them all the same, so we can just average over them.
Index the bids (b1, b2, . . . ) in decreasing order. Then, depending on the
chosen pˆ = f(z), we either show (when the appropriate queries occur) ad 1, or
ads 1 and 2, etc. Prop SI says that no matter what pˆ is, the average CTR of
the ads we show is the same. Suppose that all the ads are on the same query.
Then Prop SI implies p1 =
1
2p1+
1
2p2, so p1 = p2;
1
2 (p1+ p2) =
1
3 (p1+ p2+ p3),
so p1 = p2 = p3; and so on. When the ads are on different queries, the weights
in the above equalities change to reflect the query distribution, but are still all
positive and sum to 1, so the same inductive reasoning holds.
This result implies that under selection mechanism ALL, when Prop E2 holds
the prediction map f∗(z) = EC [p |z] is self-calibrated. Next, we show this map
is in fact also efficiency-maximizing:
Theorem 2. Under selection mechanism ALL, Prop E2 implies f∗ is efficiency
maximizing, where f∗(z) = EC [p |z].
Proof. Recall we need to show f∗ maximizes
EV (f) =
∑
i∈C
PrQ(qi)Pr(i |qi, f)(pibi − 1).
Since selection decisions for one z value do not impact others, it suffices to
consider a single z value. We can decompose the sum over C over the partition
that associates all the ads that share a common bid and raw prediction. Let
B = {i |bi = b, zi = z} ⊆ C be the element of this partition for (b, z). For a given
f(z) = pˆ, either all the ads in B show (when their respective queries occur), or
none of them do; thus, if we can show that f∗ shows these ads if and only if
they increase EV, we are done. The expected value per query of showing these
ads is: ∑
i∈B
PrQ(qi)Pr(i |qi, f)(pibi − 1). (5)
Since Pr(i | qi, f) ∈ {0, 1} must be the same for all these ads, this quantity is
non-negative if and only if
∑
i∈B Pr
Q(qi)(pibi − 1) ≥ 0.
Recall PrC(i) = Pr
Q(qi)/C where C =
∑
i∈C Pr
Q(qi). We have PrC(i ∧ b ∧
z) = PrC(i) if i ∈ B, and 0 otherwise. Letting CB =
∑
i∈B Pr
Q(qi), then
PrC(b ∧ z) =
CB
C
, and so
PrC(i |b, z) =
PrC(i)
CB/C
=
PrQ(qi)/C
CB/C
=
PrQ(qi)
CB
(6)
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for i ∈ B, and 0 otherwise. Then,
EC [p |z] = EC [p |b, z] Prop E2
=
∑
i∈C
PrC(i |b, z)pi
=
1
CB
∑
i∈B
PrQ(qi)pi. Eq. (6)
Using this result, we have
∑
i∈B
PrQ(qi)(pibi − 1) = b
(∑
i∈B
PrQ(qi)pi
)
− CB)
= CB(bEC [p |z]− 1).
This quantity is non-negative if and only if bf∗(z)− 1 ≥ 0; since this is exactly
the condition we use to decide whether or not to show the ads in B, we are
done.
It is not hard to directly prove that under selection mechanism ALL, Prop SI
implies f∗ is efficiency-maximizing: the idea is to consider again a single z, sort
the ads by bid into blocks, and show by induction that each block has average
CTR f∗(z).
In Section 4 we saw that the problem of finding an efficiency-maximizing f
is NP-hard under mechanism ONE, even under the assumption of a single bid.
Under Prop E1, fortunately the situation is much easier:
Theorem 3. Under selection mechanism ONE, if Prop E1 holds then the predic-
tion map f∗ where f∗(z) = EC [p |z] is efficiency-maximizing and self-calibrated.
Proof. For a query q, consider a partition Bq of C(q) into sets of ads that share
a common b and z, so the elements of the partition are
Bqb,z = {i |bi = b, zi = z, qi = q} ⊆ C(q)
for each (b, z) pair.
All i ∈ B for some B must share a common value Prf (i |q). We also use B
as the event that some i ∈ B shows; so for example Prf (B |q) is the probability
that some ad from B shows. Under selection mechanism ONE, for each i ∈ B,
we have Prf (i |B, q) =
1
|B| (since ties are broken at random). Also,
EC [p |b, z, q] =
1
|Bqb,z|
∑
i∈Bq
b,z
pi. (7)
14
Recalling cost is zero under ONE, for any f ,
EV(f)
=
∑
q∈Q
PrQ(q)
∑
i∈C(q)
Prf (i |q)pibi
=
∑
q∈Q
PrQ(q)
∑
B
q
b,z
∈Bq
∑
i∈Bq
b,z
Prf (i |q)pibi
=
∑
q∈Q
PrQ(q)
∑
B
q
b,z
∈Bq
Prf (B
q
b,z |q)
1
|Bqb,z |
∑
i∈Bq
b,z
pib
and using Eq. (7),
=
∑
q∈Q
PrQ(q)
∑
B
q
b,z
∈Bq
Prf (B
q
b,z |q)bEC [p |b, z, q]
≤
∑
q∈Q
PrQ(q) max
B
q
b,z
∈Bq
bEC [p |b, z, q].
Thus, it is sufficient to show that selecting ads using f∗ produces the expected
value in the last line of the above inequality. For each query, we rank the ads
using b · f∗(z) = bEC[p |b, z, q], and so this is exactly the expected value that f
∗
obtains.
To see that f∗ is self-calibrated, observe that when Prf (z, b, q) > 0,
Ef [p |z, b, q] = EC [p |z, b, q] = f
∗(z),
and so
Ef [p |z] =
∑
b,q
Prf (b, q |z)Ef [p |z, b, q] = f
∗(z).
5.2 Negative Results
We show several negative results relating to the assumptions considered in the
previous section.
ONE and ALL: Prop SI does not imply Prop E1 Consider an example with
two queries, each equally likely. Each query has two candidates, given as the
following (p, b) tuples (they all share a common z):
q1 q2
A (0.1, 1) C (0.1, 2)
B (0.2, 2) D (0.2, 1)
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Because of the symmetry between these queries, under any f (and either se-
lection mechanism), ad A must show with the same probability as ad D, as
must ads B and C. Thus, for any f , Ef [p | b = 1, z] = 0.15, and similarly
Ef [p | b = 2, z] = 0.15. Thus, selection invariance holds, as does Prop E2.
However, EC [p |z, b = 1, q1] = 0.1 6= EC [p |z, q1] = 0.15.
ONE: Prop E2 does not imply Prop SI Consider the example, with two
equally likely queries, and two distinct raw predictions:
q1 q2
A (0.2, 2, z1) C (0.1, 2, z1)
B (0.1, 1, z1) D (0.2, 1, z1)
E (1.0, 9, z2)
Note that EC [p | z1, b = 1] = EC [p | z1, b = 2] = 0.15. However, if we consider
two prediction maps f(z1) = 0.5, f(z2) = 1 and f
′(z1) = 1, f
′(z2) = 0, under
selection mechanism ONE, we have Ef [p |z1] = 0.1, but Ef ′ [p |z1] = 0.15.
ONE: Prop SI does not imply a nice problem We have four queries, each
equally likely; the bids for the ads on q3 and q4 are defined in terms of some
small ǫ > 0, with (p, b, z) tuples:
q1 q2 q3 q4
A (1, 2, z1) C (1, 2, z2) A’ (0, 2ǫ, z1) C’ (0, 2ǫ, z2)
B (0, 2, z2) D (0, 1, z1) B’ (1, 2ǫ, z2) D’ (1, 1ǫ, z1)
Note that q3 and q4 mirror q1 and q2, except that the bids are scaled by ǫ,
and the CTRs are reversed. Under any f , ads A and A′ show with the same
probability, as do B and B′, and the other two pairs. Thus, under selection by
any f , we have Ef [p |z1] = Ef [p |z2] = 0.5 whenever the expectation is defined,
and so Prop SI holds. However, as ǫ → 0, only q1 and q2 have any impact
on efficiency. Thus, as before we have constraints on the optimal solution that
f(z1) > f(z2) >
1
2f(z1). Thus, the prediction map f
∗ with f∗(z1) = 0.5 and
f∗(z2) = 0.5 is not efficiency-maximizing, as it only shows ad A on q1 only half
the time.
6 Discussion and Future Work
Our sufficient conditions are quite strong, but not unrealistic. They require that
the bid and query not add any information about the CTR, conditional on the
raw prediction. CTR estimation systems normally use queries as features (e.g.,
[13]), so it is reasonable to hope that the query does not add extra information.
Bids are set by advertisers for query-ad pairs, which are already used by CTR
estimation systems, so any systematic patterns in bids are likely to be accounted
for. Since advertisers have much less information than the auctioneer, it seems
unlikely that they can add extra information about CTRs through fine-grained
16
bid manipulation. We can test if our sufficient conditions hold by running
randomization experiments that change the mix of ads shown.
Since randomized predictions cannot in general lead to maximum efficiency,
it is natural to first consider deterministic prediction maps. Nevertheless, given
the negative results in the current work, it would be interesting to also study
randomized calibration strategies that provide calibration guarantees without
needing IID assumptions. Then the natural question becomes: how much effi-
ciency is lost by using a randomized calibration strategy, versus using a deter-
ministic efficiency-maximizing prediction map that is not self-calibrated.
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